Working Papers
Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Evaluations of Partisan Fairness in District-Based Democracies (with Gary King and Elizabeth Rosenblatt)
We clarify the theoretical foundations of partisan fairness standards for district-based democratic electoral systems, including essential assumptions and definitions that have not been formalized or in some cases even discussed. We pare assumptions down to their minimal essential components and add extensive empirical evidence for those with observable implications. Throughout, we follow a fundamental prin- ciple of statistics too often ignored — defining the quantity of interest separately so its measures are vulnerable to being proven wrong, evaluated, and improved. This enables us to prove which approaches — claimed in the literature to be estimators of partisan symmetry, the most widely accepted standard — are statistically appro- priate and which are biased, limited, or not measures of symmetry at all. Because real world redistricting involves complicated politics with numerous participants and conflicting goals, measures biased for partisan fairness sometimes still provide useful descriptions of other aspects of electoral systems.
Analyzing the Censoring Problem in U.S. Federal Campaign Finance Data (with R.Micheal Alvarez and Seo-young Silvia Kim)
Inferences about individual campaign contributors are limited by how the Federal Election Commission (FEC) collects and reports data. Only transactions that exceed a cycle-to- date total of $200 are individually disclosed, so the contribution histories of many donors are unobserved. We contrast visible donors and "hidden donors," i.e., small donors who become invisible due to censoring and routinely ignored in existing research. We use the Sanders presidential campaign in 2016, whose unique campaign structure received money only through an intermediary committee, which is governed by stricter disclosure statutes, allowing us to study hidden donors. We show that there are many hidden donors, and they are more likely to be social and ethnic minorities. Hidden donors start giving relatively later, with contributions concentrated around early primaries, suggesting different interests or contribution incentives. We conclude that because of this censoring problem, the donor population may be quite different than found in previous research.
Prior literature uses portfolio analysis to document anomalies of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). We argue portfolio analysis introduces an aggregation bias and clouds inferences about firm-level stock price behavior. We demonstrate this point in the context of the Post-Earnings Announcement Drift (PEAD), a well-known anomaly of the EMH. After replicating the PEAD portfolio analysis, we disaggregate the PEAD portfolios and find anomalies within the PEAD anomaly. Results of our analysis raise concerns over whether the PEAD exists at disaggregated levels, firms' prices actually drift in the direction of earnings news, and whether the PEAD is an anomaly of the EMH or just an artifact of aggregation.
Auctioning off the Agenda: Bargaining in Legislatures with Endogenous Scheduling (with Jernej Copic)
Caltech Social Science Working Paper #1266. There are
many examples of allocation problems where the final
allocation affects more than one agent, but the models
developed to study them typically allow for side
payments between agent. However, there are political
economy applications where it is hard to imagine
monetary transfers between the agents, at least not
legal ones. In this paper we propose a general
political economic framework for the study of
allocation problems with externalities without side
payments. We consider a setup with complete information
and we formulate the problem as one where the status
quo describes an initial allocation that can altered in
a sequence of proposals. The number of these proposals
is restricted. In the context of our main application,
bidding for slots on a legislative agenda, such
restriction can be interpreted as scarcity of plenary
time for considering the possible bills to move the
policy. The intuition for our model comes out of
framing the problem as a special type of a multi-good
auction. We show that equilibria generically exist
within the general model.
Caltech Social Science Working Paper #1267R. Since the
passage of he "Help America Vote Act" in 2002, nearly
half of the states have adopted a variety of new
identification requirements for voter registration and
participation by the 2006 general election. There has
been little analysis of whether these requirements
reduce voter participation, espe- cially among certain
classes of voters. In this paper we document the effect
of voter identification requirements on registered
voters as they were imposed in states in the 2000 and
2004 presidential elections, and in the 2002 and 2006
midterm elections. Looking first at trends in the
aggregate data, we find no evidence that voter
identification requirements reduce participation. Using
individual-level data from the Current Population
Survey across these elections, however, we find that
the strictest forms of voter identification re-
quirements — combination requirements of presenting an
identification card and positively matching one's
signature with a signature either on file or on the
identification card, as well as requirements to show
picture identification — have a negative impact on the
participation of registered voters relative to the
weakest requirement, stating one's name. We also find
find evidence that the stricter voter identification
requirements depress turnout to a greater ex- tent for
less educated and lower income populations, but no
racial differences.